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NO. 39 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction 
Libya: Getting Serious about Negotiations 
How a New Political Process Could Help Tackle Security Challenges 
Wolfram Lacher 
Libya’s longstanding political deadlock reached breaking point with the fighting 
between rival militias in Tripoli in September 2018. Throughout the preceding two 
years of political stalemate, the UN-led approach to negotiations remained vested in 
defunct institutions that blocked any progress. As a result, there was no prospect 
for the formation of regular security forces under government control, let alone the 
unification of Libya’s divided security institutions. Addressing these security chal-
lenges requires a new push for a transitional power-sharing agreement with a road-
map towards elections. Negotiations need to involve actors with influence on the 
ground, including representatives of armed groups. Such a push should also include 
talks over new security arrangements in Tripoli, as well as efforts at reunifying eco-
nomic institutions. 
 
Two recent crises have put severe pressure on 
the political stalemate that has prevailed in 
Libya since the establishment of the Govern-
ment of National Accord (GNA) in early 2016. 
In June 2018, forces loyal to Khalifa 
Haftar – the de facto ruler of eastern Libya 
who does not recognise the GNA – briefly 
lost control over two major oil export termi-
nals to local opponents. After restoring his 
authority over the area, Haftar stopped 
the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation 
(NOC) from resuming oil exports, implicitly 
demanding changes at the NOC and the 
Central Bank to allow him to access state 
funds. Haftar eventually caved in to heavy 
external pressure. The issues at the core of 
the dispute remain unresolved: who runs 
the Central Bank, and how it distributes its 
resources. 
In late August, armed groups from 
Tarhuna, Misrata, and Zintan moved into 
Tripoli, clashing with the four local militias 
that had divided up much of the capital 
among themselves over the previous year. 
Throughout that time, discontent had built 
up among a wide range of political and 
military players over the unbridled pillag-
ing of state resources by these four militias. 
The attackers mobilised based on such 
resentment. After a month of intermittent 
fighting, a counter-offensive by the Tripoli 
militias forced the attacking groups to with-
draw. The GNA’s Presidency Council issued 
a range of decisions to curb the influence 
of the Tripoli militias, but their successful 
defence against the attackers places them 
in a position to resist the implementation 
of these decisions. This threatens to restore 
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the situation that preceded the fighting, 
in which territorial control in Tripoli corre-
sponded to a highly unequal distribution 
of spoils – a situation that is wholly un-
sustainable. 
These two crises underlined the limits of 
the status quo: During the year preceding 
the fighting in Tripoli, no realistic prospect 
for peaceful change existed, as the political 
process remained deadlocked. Both crises 
also demonstrated the impracticability of 
rapid elections offering a way out of Libya’s 
crisis – an objective whose most prominent 
proponent is France’s President Emmanuel 
Macron, but which is controversial both 
within Libya and internationally. They un-
derlined the urgent need for renegotiating 
the current dysfunctional power-sharing 
agreement to enable progress towards elec-
tions. Moreover, they revealed that the GNA 
had made no headway whatsoever towards 
re-establishing unified, loyal security insti-
tutions. Progress in this domain remains 
dependent on negotiations over the forma-
tion of a sufficiently united and legitimate 
government to which such institutions 
could be loyal. 
However, these crises have also uncovered 
new opportunities for moving beyond the 
longstanding political deadlock. Haftar’s 
closure of the oil ports was his first real 
attempt at bargaining for a stake in central 
government institutions. This is an impor-
tant departure from his prior rejectionist 
stance towards negotiations over power-
sharing. The fighting in Tripoli has opened 
up a chance for negotiating more sustaina-
ble security arrangements in the capital – 
an important prerequisite for the formation 
of a real unity government. Taken together, 
the current situation offers an opportunity 
to shed an institutional framework that has 
prevented political progress for too long, 
and to design a new negotiating process 
that closely links talks over power-sharing 
with efforts to reunify economic and secu-
rity institutions. 
Towards a New Negotiating 
Framework 
Over the past two years, failed attempts 
to implement the December 2015 Libyan 
Political Agreement (LPA) have given way 
to unsuccessful efforts to amend the agree-
ment and, eventually, an equally frustrated 
push to prepare the grounds for elections. 
The obstacles to progress not only resided 
in persistent political divisions but increas-
ingly also in the unworkable institutional 
setup the LPA created. This setup lent enor-
mous spoiling powers to those holding 
formal positions – members of the two 
legislative bodies, as well as of the GNA’s 
Presidency Council – despite their almost 
complete lack of a political or military 
power base. 
The LPA divorced formal political author-
ity from actual power relations on the 
ground in two ways. First, representatives 
of armed groups as such had not been part 
of the LPA negotiations, and expectations 
that political representatives would bring 
armed groups in their constituencies to sup-
port the unity government proved overly 
optimistic. Second, under the LPA, the gov-
ernment drew its legitimacy exclusively 
from international recognition. This meant 
that efforts to seize power in Tripoli by force 
were futile, thereby keeping the struggles in 
western Libya in check. 
However, in this framework, Libyans out-
side the LPA’s discredited institutions had 
almost no prospect of recalibrating the dys-
functional power-sharing agreement. Alli-
ance-building between actors with real 
influence on the ground was of no conse-
quence for formal politics, which played 
out in the LPA institutions according to 
their own logic. The crucial role of inter-
national recognition, combined with in-
ternational insistence on the institutional 
straightjacket of the LPA, also became an 
insurmountable hurdle to Libyan-led ini-
tiatives. Western governments and the 
UN – fearful that they would lose their 
official Libyan counterpart should the 
Presidency Council fall – helped keep the 
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deadlock in place by sticking to the façade 
of internationally legitimised institutions. 
To seize the current opportunity and 
break out of the longstanding deadlock, a 
new negotiating framework is needed. The 
UN and foreign powers should stop chasing 
after the mirage of a constitutionally water-
tight agreement, for which – as was the 
assumption throughout the past two years 
– they would need the support of formal 
Libyan institutions. These institutions have 
abundantly demonstrated that they will 
not agree on any solution that would make 
them redundant. More to the point, these 
institutions cannot deliver the constitu-
tional legitimacy that external actors are 
seeking. The two legislative bodies face 
multiple challenges to their constitutional 
validity. The Presidency Council, in turn, 
exists by virtue of international recognition 
only. One of the two legislative bodies – 
the Tobruk-based House of Representa-
tives – never ratified the LPA, leaving its 
institutions in a state of constitutional 
limbo. Nor does the draft constitution offer 
a clear path forward: A referendum on the 
constitution would prove divisive and likely 
result in the draft’s rejection; in addition, 
the House of Representatives did its best 
to sow doubts over the validity of the legis-
lation for the referendum. Libya’s institu-
tions have irreversibly lost their consti-
tutional basis. 
The demise of the very basis for legiti-
mate institutions also underpins the French-
led initiative for rapid elections, which 
intends to re-create an authority that enjoys 
popular legitimacy. But because of the haste 
with which the Macron initiative sought to 
organise elections, it stuck to the existing 
institutional framework, merely adding 
Haftar as a negotiating party – the only 
one among the four Libyan representatives 
invited to Paris in May 2018 who actually 
wields influence on the ground. But that 
framework cannot produce a credible basis 
for elections. The net effect of the unrealis-
tic deadlines imposed by the French ini-
tiative was to divert attention from the 
need to build a more viable negotiating 
framework. 
A new power-sharing agreement that 
dispenses with the current institutions 
would be no less constitutionally valid than 
the LPA has been. Potentially, however, it 
would be more functional and associate the 
actual parties to the conflict, rather than 
vague proxies for these parties. Negotiations 
over such an agreement would aim at creat-
ing a new executive authority, along with 
provisions for the reunification of the sov-
ereign economic institutions – most im-
portantly the Central Bank – and detailed 
security arrangements, including a single 
military command structure. Such an agree-
ment would also include a clear roadmap 
towards elections for a new legislature, 
the preparation of which would be the top 
priority of the executive. The 2011 Constitu-
tional Declaration – along with its amend-
ments until the mid-2014 split of state insti-
tutions – could furnish the constitutional 
basis for parliamentary elections. Presiden-
tial elections would be more problematic, 
since the Constitutional Declaration does 
not provide a basis for the post of a presi-
dent, and a presidential vote would risk 
provoking a winner-takes-all conflict. 
The National Conference – a gathering 
of political representatives that the UN Sup-
port Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) plans to 
convene in the coming months – could 
potentially offer local support for sidelining 
the existing institutions. Even so, there 
would be no doubt about the fact that an 
agreement reached within a new frame-
work would receive its force not from its 
domestic, constitutional legitimacy, but 
from international backing and the com-
mitment of influential Libyan actors to it. 
Armed Actors at the Table 
A negotiating framework that centres on 
representatives of actual political and mili-
tary forces on the ground – rather than on 
defunct institutions – has a greater chance 
of producing an agreement that can actually 
be implemented, thereby permitting pro-
gress towards elections. 
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Leaders or representatives of armed 
groups have to be part of the negotiating 
process for three reasons. First, only if they 
themselves have a stake in a power-sharing 
agreement are they likely to even begin 
considering a gradual takeover of security 
functions by forces that are loyal to the 
executive authority as a whole, rather than 
to representatives of individual factions. 
Second, any viable agreement will need 
to include detailed provisions on security 
arrangements – possibly even several sub-
national security agreements that are asso-
ciated with a broader political deal. Only 
the parties that are directly concerned by 
such arrangements can negotiate them. 
This is one lesson from the failures of the 
LPA, which only included general objectives 
of security arrangements and did not offer 
any practical steps for their implementation 
or gather commitments from those con-
cerned. Third, any negotiations over unify-
ing security institutions – including the 
military command – will need to involve 
representatives of the larger armed groups, 
including Haftar’s. No agreement on the 
reunification of security institutions can 
succeed without the buy-in from at least 
some of those who control the bulk of the 
country’s heavy weapons. 
The involvement of armed actors in 
power-sharing talks poses a number of chal-
lenges. In the absence of neatly defined 
conflict parties, the selection of representa-
tives for negotiations would necessarily be 
somewhat arbitrary. Few actors in Libya’s 
conflicts are coherent political-military 
forces with clearly identifiable leaderships; 
Haftar’s organisation is the most significant 
exception to this rule. Some military forces, 
such as the armed groups of Misrata and 
Zintan, respond to a diffuse, collective 
leadership. No single figure can claim to 
represent such forces, and the ability of 
representatives to negotiate on behalf of 
them can vary significantly over the course 
of a negotiating process. Other forces, such 
as several of the militias in the capital of 
Tripoli, have leaders who appear to have 
no clear political interests, or even political 
awareness. Not all forces can be equally 
represented in an adequate manner during 
political negotiations; others may have to 
be engaged in detailed talks over security 
arrangements. 
Another danger of inviting representa-
tives of armed groups to the table is bestow-
ing violent actors with legitimacy, thereby 
sending the message that violence pays. The 
appearance of controversial militia leaders 
at UN-led talks could undermine public 
approval for those talks. However, the ex-
ample of the most controversial of all the 
Libyan warlords, Khalifa Haftar, relativises 
such concerns. Over the past two years, his 
political adversaries have come to terms 
with Haftar playing a key role in any nego-
tiations, and several have met with him 
themselves, at the risk of alienating their 
constituencies. 
This is not to say that the solution lies 
only in talks between those who wield 
direct control over the violence – far from 
it. The designation of negotiating parties 
could broadly follow considerations of in-
fluence and representation. This includes 
influence over armed groups, just as it in-
cludes political influence through media 
empires, through patronage – in the case 
of leading businessmen – or through the 
control of vital economic institutions, such 
as the Central Bank. It also includes social 
influence, reflected in the ability to repre-
sent majority positions in individual com-
munities. Such a diversity of negotiating 
parties should also partially assuage con-
cerns about rewarding violent actors by al-
lowing them a seat at the negotiating table. 
When designing the negotiating process, 
an important question will concern the 
relation between talks over power-sharing 
– including by reunifying economic insti-
tutions – and those specifically over more 
security-related issues. Each will depend 
on the other for its own success. Although 
creating separate forums for detailed delib-
erations over security arrangements makes 
sense, such talks would nevertheless have 
to be explicitly linked to negotiations over 
a broader political settlement. Moreover, 
representatives of leading armed groups 
cannot be relegated to purely security-
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related talks, but will also need to be part of 
negotiations on the composition of execu-
tive authority and the command structures 
in unified security institutions. 
A Strategic Approach to 
Security Challenges 
The reunification of security institutions 
and the dismantling of Libya’s innumerable 
militias are two key interconnected chal-
lenges to the success of any agreement. 
Since the failure of the LPA in this regard 
has become apparent, two initiatives have 
sought to address these challenges. First, 
Egypt has hosted talks between Libyan 
military officers over command structures 
in a unified Libyan army. Second, UNSMIL 
has begun work on a strategy for engage-
ment with armed groups whose ultimate 
objective is the demobilisation of these 
groups in the medium term. This strategy 
is one pillar of a nascent approach within 
UNSMIL on security-related challenges; the 
other two pillars are efforts to support the 
reunification of security institutions and 
capacity-building for regular security forces. 
However, in their current form, these 
initiatives are not (and cannot be) part of a 
coherent political framework that would 
tackle Libya’s security challenges strategi-
cally. A fundamental problem of both 
initiatives is their assumption that regular 
security forces exist in Libya, separately 
from the armed groups. This assumption 
is not informed by realities on the ground: 
The entirety of Libya’s security sector is 
beset by factionalism. Units that are loyal 
to particular individuals – rather than to 
the non-existent state – or associated 
with particular localities cannot be regular 
forces, regardless of whether the officers 
of Qadhafi’s army play a dominant role 
in them. Regular, loyal forces can only 
be formed if there is a unified executive 
authority that they can be loyal to. 
Instead, political considerations are 
behind the distinction between regular 
forces and armed groups. The Egyptian 
initiative confers official status upon 
Haftar’s organisation, whose self-descrip-
tion alternates between “Libyan Arab 
Armed Forces” and “Libyan National Army”, 
neither of which is the official name of 
Libya’s military. Egypt thereby distinguishes 
Haftar’s forces from other armed groups, 
according a critical advantage to its ally. 
UNSMIL also distinguishes between regular 
forces and armed groups, and conceives of 
its approach to each as separate pillars of 
its nascent security strategy. This offers the 
political advantage of facilitating engage-
ment with Haftar’s and the GNA’s military 
commands, both of which claim to repre-
sent regular forces. 
However, separating talks between sup-
posed representatives of regular forces over 
reunifying security-sector institutions from 
those with armed groups over their dis-
mantlement makes progress impossible on 
both fronts. Even leaving aside the obvious 
obstacle of Egypt’s bias in favour of Haftar 
for a successful Egyptian mediating role, 
the Cairo talks cannot deliver an imple-
mentable agreement. Whereas Haftar’s 
officers in the talks represent a force that 
controls the east of the country, most of the 
western and southern Libyan officers who 
act as their counterparts do not control 
sizeable forces, and they often do not enjoy 
the support of the armed groups in their 
communities. Any agreement in this frame-
work would therefore mean that Haftar 
exerts overwhelming influence in a unified 
army, which most armed groups in areas 
outside Haftar’s control would reject. For 
Europeans, the question now is how they 
can ensure Egyptian support for a more 
functional framework – one preferably 
led by UNSMIL, possibly in coordination 
with Egypt and a less biased third state. 
Only negotiations that include repre-
sentatives of major armed groups across 
the country – including Haftar’s – could 
potentially produce progress on the twin 
challenges of reunification and militia dis-
mantlement. The integration of members 
of the armed groups into regular forces 
will be an important aspect of any effort to 
dismantle the militias. There are different 
options for structuring and sequencing 
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such negotiations: Political negotiations 
could come first, with the aim of forming 
an executive authority and army command 
that would then define the parameters of 
how leaders and members of armed groups 
are integrated into unified security insti-
tutions. Or bottom-up negotiations over 
local security arrangements and the forma-
tion of joint, integrated units at the local 
level could run parallel to high-level politi-
cal negotiations. This would provide the 
new executive authority with security struc-
tures it can link up to and work with, as 
well as create broader support for a political 
deal at the central government level. 
Whichever way these challenges are 
approached, the immediate aim should be 
realistic, intermediary steps towards the 
ultimate goal of rebuilding regular forces. 
Given the absence of regular security forces 
and pervasive distrust between the con-
flicting parties, it is unrealistic to expect 
armed groups to surrender their weapons 
immediately after a political deal. The 
parties to a deal would initially retain at 
least part of their coercive force to insure 
against the possibility of their adversaries 
reneging on the agreement. 
For such an agreement to enable pro-
gress towards the formation of regular 
forces, it is critical that the deal not allow 
the parties to use their access to state 
resources to expand their coercive capaci-
ties. This is a key lesson from Libya’s failed 
political transition between 2011 and 2014, 
when rival political-military interest groups 
competed over resource allocation in the 
security sector, leading to the emergence of 
powerful militia conglomerates that ended 
up fighting each other. This concern is all 
the more relevant today, as an important 
driver behind Haftar’s growing interest in 
a political deal appears to be his decreasing 
ability to mobilise funds from his external 
backers or the eastern Central Bank. Third-
party monitoring of state expenditures 
could play an important role in preventing 
the misuse of state funds for belligerent 
purposes and building trust between the 
parties. UNSMIL could usefully expand its 
push for the unification of economic insti-
tutions and improving their transparency 
to underpin a prospective deal on security-
sector institutions. 
The Crucial Role of Tripoli 
Security Arrangements 
Negotiating new security arrangements for 
the capital is of enormous importance for 
the viability of a new political deal, as well 
as for the ultimate handover to an elected 
government. Prior to the recent fighting, 
four large militias from Tripoli had acquired 
a stranglehold on state institutions in the 
capital. They misappropriated resources 
and placed their allies throughout the ad-
ministration. This state of affairs precluded 
any political progress: Neither the unifica-
tion of the economic institutions nor the 
establishment of a meaningful unity govern-
ment – let alone a handover to an elected 
government – was a realistic option while 
a handful of militias were calling the shots 
in the administration. The withdrawal of 
the attacking forces following a month of 
fighting, in September 2018, returned the 
capital to this unsustainable situation. 
Negotiating new security arrangements that 
would limit militia influence over state 
institutions is essential to prevent a repeat 
of the recent conflict. Devising a successful 
approach to Tripoli’s security conundrum 
could also point the way for similar local-
level agreements in flashpoints elsewhere 
in the country. 
The absence of regular forces to secure 
state institutions is a key challenge for 
UNSMIL’s efforts to negotiate new security 
arrangements. During the fighting, UNSMIL 
called on forces under the nominal com-
mand of the Western and Central Military 
Regions to intervene and separate the 
belligerents, in accordance with a decree 
issued by Prime Minister Faiez al-Serraj. 
In reality, however, these forces are local 
militias from the cities of Misrata and 
Zintan. Having successfully defended their 
control over central Tripoli, the Tripoli 
militias will resist the deployment of these 
forces in the capital. And even if they did 
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deploy, this would not, as such, solve the 
fundamental problem: The logic whereby 
each armed group extorts what it can from 
state institutions located in the territory 
it controls would continue to define the 
workings of the administration. Changing 
this logic to a situation in which armed 
groups limit their influence on the adminis-
tration as long as their adversaries do the 
same is a difficult endeavour without regu-
lar forces. 
To make progress towards security ar-
rangements that would offer greater assur-
ances to the administration, it is necessary 
to depart from the current institutional 
framework. In trying to negotiate new 
security arrangements, UNSMIL has sought 
to rely on the Presidency Council and 
its security officials – inevitably so, since 
supporting the GNA remains part of 
UNSMIL’s official mandate. However, the 
Presidency Council – or, more precisely, 
Serraj, since the Presidency Council has 
long ceased to act as a collective body – 
has adopted a highly partisan stance to the 
current crisis in Tripoli, associating itself 
closely with the four largest Tripoli militias. 
Moreover, the Presidency Council is politi-
cally weaker now than ever before. It sur-
vives only because international actors do 
not see an alternative to it, and it has long 
lost credibility among local actors that it 
can produce solutions to security problems. 
The Presidency Council and its security 
officials therefore cannot oversee security 
arrangements that seek to limit the influ-
ence of the same militias on which it has 
depended to date. 
A new negotiating framework that 
makes it clear that the Presidency Council’s 
days are numbered would allow for more 
creative approaches to Tripoli’s security 
challenges. It would place the big Tripoli 
militias under greater pressure to make 
concessions. Rather than relying on the 
Presidency Council and its discredited secu-
rity officials, UNSMIL could take the lead 
in negotiating and overseeing security 
arrangements, negotiating directly with the 
actual parties to the conflict. Moreover, to 
incentivise the forces that see themselves 
as stakeholders in Tripoli to protect state 
institutions – rather than to exploit these 
institutions – they need to be confident 
that credible efforts are being made to alter 
the composition of executive authority. 
The leadership now in place in Tripoli has 
become closely identified with the excesses 
of corruption that have marked the situa-
tion in the capital over the past two years. 
Leading forces in Tripoli have to be part of 
political negotiations over executive author-
ity, though they cannot be allowed to domi-
nate such negotiations, lest this produce a 
situation as unsustainable as the one that 
prevailed during the preceding year. 
New security arrangements for Tripoli 
should take the form of a roadmap, starting 
with immediately feasible steps and moving 
towards the gradual integration of rival 
local forces into common command struc-
tures and units. For the implementation of 
such a roadmap to succeed, it will be criti-
cal that Western and regional governments 
strongly support UNSMIL by exerting pres-
sure on violators. Because UNSMIL would 
need to focus on mediating between the par-
ties in political and security negotiations, 
it may be more appropriate for representa-
tives of individual states to help monitor the 
implementation of security arrangements 
– along with Libyan representatives – and 
call out contraventions. This requires a de-
parture from the approach that prevailed 
over the past two years, during which wary 
Western governments and the UN avoided 
challenging the status quo so that they 
could operate in Tripoli and have an official 
interlocutor in the GNA. The events over 
the past months have shown that this ap-
proach has now reached its limits. 
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